In this issue of Clinical Infectious Diseases, Forgie et al [1] offer the most compelling documentation to date of the introduction of a human influenza virus into a pig herd and subsequent related influenza epidemics in both pig and human populations. Although their article could be criticized, because nasal swab specimens from pigs were not taken to prove that the virus was not already enzootic before the likely human index case, circumstances and investigational data strongly support the authors' interpretation of the data. The event occurred at a closely monitored Canadian swine research facility, where biosecurity and laboratory support had protected the pig herd from other common swine respiratory infections. The authors' position that this was an acute and explosive human introduction of pandemic influenza A (H1N1) virus (pH1N1) in a modern swine facility was supported by the chronology of the signs in the pigs and signs and symptoms in the swine workers, the serologic investigation in the workers, the molecular detection of pH1N1 in pigs and the workers, and the subsequent genomic comparisons of the influenza A isolates.
The authors' report is also remarkable because it demonstrates that preclinical asymptomatic shedding of influenza A virus can circumvent even our best policies and biosecurity infrastructure. As we have clearly seen with the rapid international and interspecies spread of pH1N1, nonpharmaceutical interventions may slow transmission of such novel influenza A virus strains, but in the long term, such strains beat our best efforts. The report reinforces our understanding that this particular strain is often associated with subclinical infections in both humans and pigs. The authors' observation that 94% of pH1N1-infected pigs had no clinical signs is consistent with a recent report in which 64% of influenza A virus-naive Norwegian swine herds showed no signs of infection after pH1N1 was introduced [2] . Furthermore, pH1N1 infections in pigs are transient, and experts agree that they do not threaten the safety of meat consumption. This supports the US pork industry's position that influenza A virus is not a substantial problem for the swine industry; infections are not reportable and, therefore, not a matter of their concern. In fact, misunderstandings of the public health risk of pH1N1 detection in pigs caused considerable fiscal damage to pork production at the beginning of the 2009 H1N1 pandemic. One can understand why the pork industry is unlikely to adapt influenza surveillance policies like those of the US poultry industry.
The figure provided by Forgie et al [1] clearly documents what other reports have only hinted at-the explosive nature of viral transmission among pigs in modern, confined animal feeding operations (CAFOs). We know from limited veterinary studies of Canadian pigs that swine influenza virus strains are most prevalent in areas where large herds of pigs are densely confined [3] . This is biologically plausible, because large CAFOs with numerous pig barns have weekly introductions of young immunologically naive pigs necessary to sustain influenza A infection. Despite various biosecurity and animal husbandry measures in these large facilities (eg. ''all in all out'' cohorting), influenza A virus strains often are detected in these herds. Mathematical models and epidemiological studies of swine workers have suggested that workers can serve as a bridging population to introduce the influenza A virus strains that are being amplified in the CAFOs to their surrounding human communities [4] [5] [6] [7] . With assumptions similar to that of the 1918 pandemic virus, Saenz et al [4] found that such bridging could markedly accelerate influenza virus transmission among rural communities around CAFOs. Therefore, concern exists about the ecology of influenza virus strains in modern swine production facilities, because infections may often be without signs, swine influenza virus epizootics can be explosive, and novel viruses may readily move to adjacent human populations.
The report by Forgie et al [1] also revealed a fundamental problem about influenza surveillance in pigs: the lack of routine surveillance. According to the authors' report, the research facility did not routinely screen pigs for influenza virus, even with the understanding that cryptic influenza infections could confound experiments in their research facility. The authors stated that the subject herd was last tested for influenza 7 months prior, and testing was performed only on 3 symptomatic pigs. Consistent with the authors' report, swine influenza virus surveillance in modern CAFOs is largely passive and voluntary and generally requires a sentinel event (eg, unusual illness in pigs). This is adequate for swine production purposes but tremendously deficient from a public health perspective when the promiscuous nature of influenza virus strains circulating among swine herds since 1998 is considered. Compounding this lack of surveillance, the diagnostic requests for influenza virus detections among US pigs at least temporarily markedly declined as a result of swine farmers concerns that pH1N1 detections in their pigs might keep their pigs from market [8] . It is no secret among influenza researchers and policy makers that agricultural business concerns are hampering the surveillance for novel influenza virus among pigs. Pigs have long been identified as potential mixing vessels for the exchanging of influenza genomic material and the generation of novel strains [9] [10] [11] [12] . Modern swine production techniques may have contributed to novel influenza virus generation. Evidence for this is seen in the increase in variety of enzootic US swine strains. Vincent el al [13] reported that, from 1930s through the mid-1990s, only 1 strain (classical H1N1) of influenza virus was found among US pigs. However, in concert with the rapid growth of the swine industry since the mid-1990s (Figure 1 ) and use of modern swine production techniques (eg, increased herd size, movement of pigs, use of autogenous vaccines), numerous novel influenza virus strains have emerged in North American pigs.
Although a number of factors may have contributed to the generation of such novel strains, the large scale of modern swine production has likely contributed to the maintenance of these strains in modern herds. It came as no tremendous surprise that pigs likely contributed to the generation of pH1N1. However, there has been considerable concern that this unique strain might also become enzootic in modern pigs and that progeny strains from reassortment with other influenza strains might emerge in pigs and threaten humans and pigs with even greater morbidity.
As the authors have demonstrated in their report, pH1N1 readily moves into swine herds. A collection of World Organization for Animal Health reports showed that, since the first detections of pH1N1 in early 2009, pH1N1 has been detected in 17 countries (Table 1) . These detections are quite remarkable, considering the lack of routine influenza surveillance among pigs and the often asymptomatic nature of pH1N1 infection in pigs. In May 2010, a US veterinary diagnostic laboratory found that, among the influenza A isolates that had been sequence-typed since the beginning of the year, 19% were pH1N1 [14] . Therefore, a number of influenza researchers are now considering the likelihood that pH1N1 is enzootic among pigs in many regions of the world and are gravely concerned that surveillance among pigs must be improved for detection of novel progeny virus strains from the union of this strain with other pig, avian, human, or other animal influenza strains. Of concern, such reassortant strains in pigs have recently been detected in China [15] , Thailand [16] , and Argentina (Daniel Perez, personal communication).
In summary, Forgie et al [1] have provided a most compelling report showing the introduction by humans of pH1N1 into a modern swine herd. The introduction resulted in explosive transmission of the virus to pigs and other workers. The authors' report illustrates many of the problems with our understanding and management of emerging infectious disease threats at the human-animal interface. In this case, the problems have nothing to do with meat safety. The central issue is our deficiency in surveillance for emerging pathogens in a business climate that is threatened by such surveillance. Until we can better find ways to partner with modern agricultural interests or their cooperation is mandated by legislation, improvements in this surveillance are not likely to occur. Therefore, the public health threat is likely to remain that dangerous emerging influenza virus strains could replicate undetected in modern swine production until they have caused significant illnesses in humans.
